Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy
Volume 6
Issue 3 Spring 1997

Article 4

Book Review

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
(1997) "Book Review," Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy: Vol. 6: Iss. 3, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cjlpp/vol6/iss3/4

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policy by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.

THE WAGES OF RISK: A REVIEW OF
DEALING WITH RISK. WHY THE PUBLIC AND
THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES
Jeffrey J. Rachlinskit
DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISAGREE ON

ISSUES by Howard Margolis. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press. 1996. 227 pp.

ENViRONMENTAL

The human brain did not evolve to process the risks of living in
modem society. That much is clear from Howard Margolis's Dealing
with Risk: Why the Public and the Experts Disagree on Environmental
Issues.1 The risk of contracting diseases from consuming saccharine or
breathing asbestos befuddles us. Margolis asserts that we see environmental hazards as either quite dangerous, requiring exceptional levels of
precautions, or as basically harmless and fungible with the costs of
avoiding them.2 There appears to be no mental middle ground, and the
circumstances that induce one of these two perspectives, while predictable, involve factors that are unrelated to the actual magnitude of the
risk. Although economics teaches that we should undertake careful costbenefit analyses to determine which risks to undertake and which to
avoid, we seem - at least at an individual level - incapable of doing
SO.
Given this problem, how should social choices be made in a democracy? In most cases, society solves the problem of personal cognitive
limitations by deferring to experts. In several significant settings, however, the perceptions of ordinary citizens depart markedly from those of
experts. People fear some environmental hazards that experts say are not
dangerous and do not fear others that experts say are dangerous. Margo3
lis's explanation for this phenomenon is difficult to restate succinctly,
but it differs markedly from the usual explanations. He generally agrees
with the experts but he distrusts both expert and lay assessments of envit Assistant Professor, Cornell Law School. B.A., The Johns Hopkins University, 1988;
M.A. (Psychology), The Johns Hopkins University, 1988; J.D., Stanford University, 1993;
Ph.D. (Psychology), Stanford University, 1994.
1 HowARI

MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE EXPERTS DISA-f

GREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL. IssuES (1996).

2 Id. at 75-79.
3 It is described fully, infra in section I.B.1.
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ronment hazards. Because Margolis favors expertise, he targets his reforms towards improving expert decision-making. His analysis of the
public's perception, however, does support significant reforms that
others have endorsed. 4 Thus, Margolis's book advocates two separate
policy prescriptions: one that is implied by his analysis of the decisionmaking of lay persons, and one that he expresses directly to expert decision-making.
As to improving the public's assessment of environmental hazards,
Margolis reviews several examples of situations in which ordinary citizens adjust their perception of the dangers posed by an environmental
hazard after encountering the costs of avoiding it. In these cases, when
the same people experience both the costs and benefits of eliminating the
hazard, disagreement with the experts vanishes. Those situations contrast to ones in which the costs of avoiding a hazard are "invisible" or
otherwise off of the public's cognitive radar screen. When this is the
case, the public often disagrees with the experts and over-reacts to the
hazard. Likewise, the public may under-react if the dangers of an environmental hazard are invisible. These observations suggest that we
should enact structural reforms of the experience of risk to ensure that
ordinary citizens fully appreciate both the risks and benefits of any action
that involves environmental hazards.
This solution, however, carries significant costs that Margolis overlooks. The proposals that Margolis describes do not actually force individuals to bear both the costs and benefits of incurring an environmental
hazard. Rather, they force a community to bear both costs and benefits.
Because people within a community will experience costs and benefits to
different degrees, Margolis's theory predicts that individuals will reach
different conclusions about whether a hazard is harmful or not. Some
members of a community may want a plant shut down; some may want it
left open. Furthermore, Margolis's theory predicts that assessments of
environmental hazards tend to be quite polarized, strongly held, and difficult to dislodge. Consequently, forcing a community to choose may
tear it apart, setting neighbors against neighbors, friends against friends,
and husbands against wives.
Margolis saves his direct policy prescription for the experts. His
proposal re-states a consistent and recurring theme of administrative law
- that of agency myopia. Margolis worries that the bi-polar nature of
risk-assessment, found even among experts, leads administrative agencies to attempt to regulate away all risk once their experts deem that the
4 Clayton P. Gillette & James E. Krier, Risk Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv.
1027, 1105-09 (1990); Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHi. L. RFv. 1, 90-96 (1995); William D. Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,190 (1984).
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risk is present.5 When the Environmental Protection Agency ('EPA")
identifies a cancer risk, it tries to eliminate it utterly; when the Food and
Drug Administration finds a carcinogen entering the food supply, it tries
to banish it thoroughly, regardless of social costs. When one has a hammer, the world seems filled with nails that need pounding. Margolis's
cure for this myopia is modest, but intriguing. He would require agencies to ensure that their regulatory decisions do not cost more lives than
they save or, as he puts it, to be sure that their decisions "do no harm."
Margolis's reform would not be the first to address agency myopia.
The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA") 6 represents a
similar attempt to force federal agencies to evaluate the consequences of
their activities carefully. NEPA requires that agencies detail the environmental costs of their projects before undertaking them. 7 This process is
supposed to ensure that agencies do not inadvertently undertake environmentally destructive projects. Unfortunately, although NEPA has slowed
agency decision-making,8 thereby halting some projects that are timesensitive, it has had no obvious effect on other destructive projects. Depending upon how the government implements it, Margolis's "do no
harm" proposal may have similar consequences.
Margolis has made a significant contribution to the literature, but
the implications of his theory and his proposals carry significant costs
that he does not address. After first discussing his theory in detail and
contrasting it with other competing theories in Part I, this essay discusses
these costs in Part II. In the final analysis, even if Margolis has correctly
traced the psychological causes of disagreement between experts and the
public, the proper response to this disagreement remains unclear.
I.

MARGOLIS'S THESIS

The observation that experts and lay persons sometimes disagree
about the dangerousness of certain activities is not new. Nearly two decades of research has documented such disagreements in many areas, 9
and several theories that explain this phenomenon have emerged. Margo5 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 147-48.
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4370(d) (1994).
7 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).

8 See, e.g., ROBERT V. PERcIvAL Er A., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE,
PoLIcY 1178-81 (2d ed. 1996) (reviewing the literature on NEPA and concluding that it
has had mixed effects on agency decision-making).
9 Gillette & Krier, supra note 4, at 1071-73; Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears:
UnderstandingPerceived Risk, in Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 463
(Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, ConstitutionalMoments,
and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 264-65 (1996). The observation that lay
persons sometimes fear things that pose no real danger can be traced back several centuries.
PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 71, 104-05
(1996).
AN
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lis neatly collapses these theories into three categories: (1) ideological
differences between experts and lay persons; (2) widespread distrust of
experts by the public; and (3) different views of rationality. 10 Margolis
refers to these theories as the "usual suspects." He finds inadequacies in
each and proposes his own in their stead.
A.

THE "USUAL SUSPECTS"

1. Ideological Differences
Ideology certainly seems to influence everyone's evaluations of the
dangers of environmental hazards. People who worry about global
warming also tend to worry about ground water contamination and the
destruction of tropical rainforests. An ideological view that the environment is in danger may underlie all of these beliefs. If experts tend to
belong to a different ideological camp than the general public, then the
differences between the two groups in their assessments of environmental hazards may simply be the consequence of these different ideological
perspectives.
Margolis dispenses quickly with this theory." He observes that an
ideological account fails to explain two observed phenomenon about the
differences between experts and the general public. First, sometimes the
public is more afraid of environmental risk than the experts, and sometimes it is less afraid. If one ideological perspective were in fact overrepresented among experts, then when the experts and the general public
disagree, they should always disagree in the same way. Second, an ideological theory does not explain why committed ideologues can sometimes mobilize public support for environmental protection and other
12
times cannot.
2. Distrust
The second theory, distrust, is perhaps best illustrated by the divergence between experts and the general public on nuclear power.' 3 A
public that distrusts its institutions should fear concentrated, powerful
organizations and hence find nuclear power more worrisome than fossil
fuels; fossil fuels are associated with smaller entities such as gasoline
stations, while nuclear power plants require more significant organizational support. Furthermore, a sufficient level of public distrust probably
exists. How many news reports of bureaucratic sloppiness, ineptitude, or
outright corruption would it take to foment enough distrust of the Nusupra note 1, at 21.
11 Id. at 23-28.
12 Id. at 27-28.
13 Slovic et al., supra note 9, at 485-96.
10 MARGOLIS,
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clear Regulatory Commission ("NRC") so that the public would refuse to
believe the agency's assurances? Surely, whatever the number is, the
American media passed it years ago. The lack of faith in institutions and
the democratic process might well explain the gap between experts and
the general public.14
Margolis puts more stock in this theory than the ideological theory,
but rightly points out that it explains too much. 15 If the NRC is corrupt,
so too must be the Federal Aviation Administration, and yet millions
willingly board airplanes each year. Surely other institutional actors
such as meat inspectors or even our doctors should be equally suspect.
But in fact, we often trust large institutions and their expertise. 16 As an
illustration, Margolis uses the example of low-level radioactive materials
in medical procedures. 17 Patients willingly allow their doctors to expose
them to low doses of radioactive materials as part of a diagnostic medical
test, yet it is nearly impossible to find a community that is willing to
tolerate the presence of a medical waste disposal facility.1 8 In both
cases, experts assure lay persons that the materials are safe (in one case
safely used and in the other safely disposed of), yet the public trusts the
experts in the case of the medical diagnosis and distrusts them in the case
of the disposal facility. A generic theory that experts are not trusted fails
to account for such cases.
3. Rival Rationalities
The third theory, rival rationalities, posits that experts and the general public disagree fundamentally on what factors should be considered
in cost-benefit analyses. Experts rely on criteria for evaluating the risks
of environmental hazards that differ from those that the general public
rely on. Consider the following hypothetical as an example:
Imagine an island community of one million people that
must choose between three sources of electricity: a nuclear reactor, a biomass converter (which bums agricultural waste), and a coal-fired power plant. Assume
further that (1) the nuclear reactor's only risk is a one-inone-million chance of a meltdown which would kill everyone on the island, (2) the only risk from the biomass
converter is its emission of small amounts of dioxin,
which presents a one-in-one-million chance of causing
cancer, and (3) the only risk from the coal-fired plant is
14 Paul Slovic, Perceived Risk Trust, and Democracy, 13 RISK ANALYsis 675 (1993).
15 MARGOLms, supra note 1, at 28-32.
16 Id. at 31-32.
17 Id. at 133.
18

Id.
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its emission of sulphur dioxide, which presents a one-inten-thousand chance of causing death among the island's
sub-population of 10,000 asthmatics. 19
Because the expected number of deaths from each option is identical, the
risk assessment of an expert might conclude that the island's inhabitants
should be indifferent between the three options. However, the inhabitants almost certainly would have a preference. At least two other factors
would influence their decision - concern with equity and fear of catastrophic losses. As to the first factor, the community might well want to
ensure that each member of the community shares the risks equally. It
would seem unfair to foist all of the costs of the energy program onto a
minority of the residents, thereby making option three unpalatable. Likewise, even though option two is fair at the outset, it visits the costs of the
energy program upon a single individual each year. This may, at the end
of the year, seem unfair as well. The first option, however, risks the
destruction of the entire community. Although the first option may be
the most fair, it has the potential to extinguish the entire community
along with its culture, values, and beliefs.
These concerns obviously conflict somewhat and lead to an indeterminate result. However, mere "body-counters" 2 0 will miss the nuances
of the decision. Fairness matters, as does an assurance that the community's culture will not be wiped out entirely. Thus, the experts and the
general public may make different decisions about environmental
hazards because the public does more than calculate an expected body
count. The public views hazards as multi-dimensional, while experts
view them as uni-dimensional. In fact, Margolis identifies one version of
this theory that lists nineteen different factors that the experts ignore, but
that the general public considers important.2 1 Margolis refers to this theory as "rival rationalities." The experts and the general public disagree
on what terms to use in a rational calculus.
Margolis treats this theory as the best previously available description of the divergence between experts and the public, although he ultimately dismisses it as inadequate. He finds it particularly troubling that
19 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming EnvironmentalLaw: A Normative Critique of ComparativeRisk Analysis, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 562, 597 (1992).
20 Gillette & Krier, supra note 4, at 1075. Margolis agrees that experts "block off' other
considerations. MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 35.

21 These factors are: catastrophic potential, familiarity, understanding, uncertainty, controllability (personal), voluntariness of exposure, effects on children, effects manifestation
(delayed or immediate), effects on future generations, victim identity, dread, trust in institutions, media attention, accident history, equity, benefits, reversibility, personal stake, and origin. MARGOLIS, supra note 1,at 28 (citing Vincent Covello, Risk Comparisons and Risk
Communications, in ColvrzNICAGr'o RISK TO THE PUBLIC 79, 112 (Roger E. Kasperson &
Pieter Jan M. Stallen eds., 1991)). Sunstein presents a similar list. Sunstein, supra note 9, at

267.
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the factors that the public allegedly considers in evaluating risk do not
include the actual magnitude of the danger. 22 He devotes significant attention to discrediting each of the factors and finds that most are vaguely
defined (as in the case of "dread") or simply incorrect (as in the case of
"voluntariness"). In the end, he concludes that the list of factors "is not
so much a list of extra dimensions that worry lay people as a list of
things that might be used to rationalize lay concern in the absence of
evidence of danger in the usual sense."'23 Margolis is thus concerned that
the theory of rival rationalities depends on correlations between these
factors and the divergence between lay and expert opinion. He believes
that the causation runs in the opposite direction - the divergence is primary, and the factors that previous researchers have identified are just
how people explain why they fear things that experts say are not
dangerous.24
B.

MARGOLIS'S THEORY AND WHY

IT MATTERS

1. Margolis's Theory
Having rounded up and dismissed the "usual suspects," Margolis
thus sets the stage for his own theory that explains the divergence between the beliefs of experts and lay persons. Curiously enough, Margolis does not start with a classic case of expert and lay disagreement, such
as nuclear power or hazardous waste. Instead, he begins with a version
of the "Monte Hall" problem and adds a sprinkling of Gestalt Psychology. Although there is sharp disagreement on whether stylized problems
like the Monte Hall problem have any application to real-world
problems,2 Margolis makes a strong case that the phenomena uncovered
by such quirky problems underlie the divergence in beliefs between the
expert and the public.
Margolis's version of the Monte Hall problem 26 looks like this:
22 MARGOLIS,

supra note 1, at 34.

23 Id. at 42.

24 Margolis is not entirely convincing on this point. Although it is true that some of the
research relies on the self-reports of the subjects, which are subject to this criticism, many are
not. The usual procedure repeats the methodology described in Slovic et al., supra note 9. In
this study, the researchers elicited individuals' subjective estimates of the likelihood of various
causes of death. The subjects are not asked to describe why they disagree with experts.
25 Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond "Heuristics

and Biases", 2 Eut. REv. Soc. PsycHoL. 83 (1991). Cf.Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
On the Reality of Cognitive Illusions: A Reply to Gigerenzer's Critique, 103 PSYCHOL. RaV.
582 (1996).
26 The "Let's Make a Deal" version looks different, but poses the same issue. Imagine

you are on a game show and are asked to select the prize that is behind one of three doors.
You know that behind two of the doors is a goat and behind one is a Cadillac. You select one
door, whereupon the host of the game show reveals that a goat is behind one of the doors that
you did not select. The host then proceeds to ask you whether you want to change your initial
door selection. Should you switch? You have a 2/3 chance of winning if you do, yet most
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Three poker chips are in a cup. One is marked with a
BLUE dot on each side, and another with a RED dot on
each side. The third chip has a BLUE dot on one side
and a RED dot on the other. So there is one blue/blue
chip, one red/red chip, and one blue/red chip.
Without looking, you take out one chip, and lay it on the
table.
1. Suppose the up side turns out to be BLUE? What is
the chance that the down side will also be BLUE?2 7
Although the correct answer is 2/3, most people say 1/2.28
Although a "lay person" seeing the problem for the first time will likely
be quite certain that the answer is 1/2, an "expert" who has studied the
issue will be just as certain that it is 2/3. If this decision were important,
the lay person could simply defer to the expert. A lay person would be
uncomfortable doing so, however, and absent some challenge to his or
her belief, the lay person has no reason to question his or her initial
intuition about the answer.2 9 Furthermore, if the lay person studies the
problem long enough and listens to the multiple different explanations of
why it is 2/3, the lay person will eventually come to agree that the answer is, in fact, 2/3. Once that process happens, that lay person has now
become an expert and will never again believe that the correct answer is
1/2.
Margolis expands upon the problem by drawing from Gestalt Psychology. He observes that there are numerous illusions in which people
can perceive one of two images, but not both at the same time (e.g.,
vases/faces, or the one Margolis himself uses, the rabbit/duck). 3° One
cannot look at the vases/faces illusion and see both a vase and a face people see the one or the other. So too with risk, argues Margolis. Peopeople insist that the chance is 1/2. See generally, Daniel Friedman, The Three Door Anom-

-aly: Construction and Deconstruction (Jan. 1996) (Working Paper #344, University of Santa
Cruz).
27 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 53.
28 Margolis has a lengthy explanation for why the probability is 2/3, but the abbreviated
version is as follows:
Think of it this way. Suppose you close your eyes and draw a chip and it is
now on the table covered by your hand.... [I]f the up side is blue, the chance is 1/2
the down side is also blue.... [Tihe same holds also if the up side is not blue, but
red. So even before you know what color is on top, you would know the probability
the top color will be matched by the bottom color is 1/2. But... [before any chip is
drawn] you would simultaneously believe the probability [that the top color is
matched by the bottom color] is... 2/3. So... are you not contradicting yourself?.
MARcOLIS, supra note I, at 54 n.2.
29 Id. at 63.

30 Id. at 73-75.
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pie see PCBs either as hazardous or not hazardous; there is no middle
ground. Once again, one could defer to the experts to decide the matter,
but doing so would be an uncomfortable choice. Likewise, nuclear
power is seen either as perfectly safe or terribly risky. Even though the
reality is that nuclear power has some risks and benefits, people see it
only in this dichotomy. People also have little reason to doubt their perception that nuclear power is risky.
'3 1
These observations lead Margolis to develop his "risk matrix."
According to his theory, people view both risk and opportunity costs in
dichotomous terms. 32 That is to say, people see a hazard as either risky
or not risky, and the costs of avoiding .the hazard are either evident or not
evident to the decision-maker.
Opportunity Costs
Yes
No
Danger Yes 1. Fungibility
2. "Better Safe Than Sorry"
No 3. "Waste Not Want Not" 4. Indifference
Box number one, in the upper left, describes situations in which
people see a hazard as dangerous, but also see significant opportunity
costs inherent in avoiding the hazard. Under such circumstances the decision-maker views the situation as a tough call. By contrast, box
number two describes situations in which the decision is more clear because people view the hazard as dangerous and may not see the costs of
avoiding it. Even if the decision-maker does see the costs, he or she does
not regard them as serious or significant. The aphorism, "better safe than
sorry," depicts this situation, and the decision-maker would endure the
expense of avoiding the hazard. Box number three describes the mirror
image of box number two. In this situation, people view the hazard as
not serious, and see significant opportunity costs that they will not sacrifice to avoid the hazard - "waste not, want not." Finally, there are
those circumstances in which people believe that a hazard is not dangerous and the opportunity costs are low, and hence the decision-maker is
indifferent to taking the precaution or avoiding it.
Margolis argues that normally people want to be in box number
33
one. People have some tolerance for hazards that leads them to incur
risk until the danger becomes fungible with further trade-offs. There
may, however, be situations in which an individual does not see a trade31

Id. at 76.

32

Id. at 81-85.
Margolis does not really address box number four, as it is not significant for his

33

theory.
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off or fungibility and hence is unwittingly trapped in boxes number two
or number three. In box number two, the individual sees no benefit from
incurring further risk. As Margolis notes, this fact may be either because
there is no benefit or because the person does not see any benefit. Likewise, people who do not see the danger in a situation that is actually
dangerous are trapped in box number three.
Just as it is possible to learn the logic of the Monte Hall problem,
Margolis argues, it is possible to develop experience or expertise that
moves people from one box to another. 34 Studying the problem of coalfired and nuclear power plants can lead to the conclusion that the social
costs of the coal-fired power plants are greater than the social costs of
nuclear power plants. From these observations arise Margolis's explanation for the dichotomy between experts and the general public. The public sees no reason to incur the risks of nuclear power ("better safe than
sorry") because they fail to appreciate the hazards of conventional energy
sources. As a result, nuclear power stands out as an especially dangerous
source of electricity. By contrast, experts see benefits from nuclear
power because it reduces the need for the equally dangerous coal-fired
plants. In other situations, the public sees no reason to undertake some
set of precautions - "waste not, want not" - because they fail to internalize a danger that experts know can easily be avoided.
2.

Why It Matters

Margolis's theory is complex - more so than the "usual suspects."
But settling upon the right explanation for the divergence between experts and public opinion is not merely an academic exercise. Explaining
why this phenomenon occurs has direct policy implications. If the first
"usual suspect," ideological differences, underlies most disagreements
between experts and the public, then the divergence is not a true source
of any serious difficulties. A democratic society hashes out ideological
differences through the political process: The ideology that attracts the
most votes wins. If ideology explains differences between the public and
experts, then the phenomenon may be interesting, but it poses no institutional challenges or difficulties. Our society will resolve it in the same
way that we resolve other ideological disputes.
The same cannot be said for the second suspect, distrust. This theory implies that experts' judgments that activities are harmful are correct,
but that they cannot convey this understanding to the public. Under this
view, a skeptical public ignores its experts. This is not merely a matter
of different preferences or tastes, for disregarding experts due to a lack of
trust will cost lives. If distrust is the issue, then the solution is to foster
34 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 71.
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trust. Because trust is easily shattered and hard to build, the clear policy
implication of this theory is that an expert body such as an administrative
agency can build trust only by scrupulously avoiding any appearance of
scandal and impropriety. In contemporary America, with its politicallycharged climate and deep suspicion of the federal government, this solution may be impossible. Under the distrust theory, the unwillingness to
follow experts is but one of the many costly by-products of the suspicion
and general distrust of government that is widely held by much of the
general public.
Under the "rival rationalities" theory, the public makes more sophisticated choices than the experts. Hence, the public should be considered
correct. Under this theory, the experts are useful advisors, but they do
not incorporate all of the elements of decision-making that lay persons
use in their analysis of risk. The lay person's perspective includes reference to values that our society cherishes, such as equality, that expertise
somehow eclipses. Experts should therefore play a role in informing lay
persons about the consequences of society's decisions, but they should
not make choices about which hazards should be avoided.
The implications of Margolis's theory are discussed below. The
different implications of the four explanations for the disagreements between experts and the public can be summarized as follows:
Theory
1. Ideology
2. Distrust
3. Rival Rationalities
4. Margolis's Theory

C.

Policy Prescription
Do nothing; let political process take
its course
Experts are right; agencies should
work to foster trust
Lay persons are right; experts should
only provide basic information
Can improve both expert and lay
decision-making by restructuring
decision-making tasks

MARGOLIS'S POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS

Margolis is cautious about policy. His purpose is not really to generate policy prescriptions so much as to explain why experts and the
public disagree. Indeed, as to lay decision-making, he makes no direct
recommendation. Unlike the "usual suspects," Margolis does not directly side with either the experts or the general public. One does suspect that he favors the experts, however. Consider his observation that
throughout human history there are no instances in which the general
public disagreed with the experts and later knowledge then emerged that
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proved the public correct. 35 Nevertheless, Margolis avoids the straightforward assertion that might follow from such an observation: that the
disagreement between experts and the public is a natural product of the
psychology of judgment and choice and that while its fears are understandable, the public should swallow them and trust society's experts.
Margolis does not criticize lay judgment directly, but he does provide
anecdotes which suggest that he believes that lay judgment can be
manipulated in ways that would make it more sensible. He saves his one
true policy prescription, however, for the experts.
1. Improving The Public's Judgment
Margolis retells some significant anecdotes as evidence for his theory. These anecdotes describe radical changes in the public's perception
of an environmental hazard that have occurred when communities have
experienced the costs of avoiding such a risk firsthand. This phenomenon suggests that lay persons stuck in boxes number two or number three
of Margolis's risk matrix can properly move themselves into box number
one by enduring both the risks and benefits of exposure to environmental
hazards. Margolis uses these anecdotes as support for a descriptive theory, but they clearly have a prescriptive norm.
Consider the example of asbestos removal in the New York City
public schools. 36 Margolis argues that, at first, parents of children were
squarely in box number three. They believed asbestos was a serious hazard, and although the parents were vaguely aware of at least some of the
costs of removal, these costs were really "off' of their cognitive radar
screens. The parents did not, in a sense, fully appreciate the enormity of
these expenses - that is, at least not until the schools had to be closed
for several weeks to begin the removal process. Parents then had to find
child care during the school year and suddenly found themselves rethinking the dangers of asbestos. As the real costs of the program moved
"on screen," parents began to oppose the asbestos removal and moved
into box number one - fungibility. It was not merely the case that the
parents were unwilling to pay their share of the price of asbestos removal, as an economist might argue. 37 Rather, their perception of the
magnitude of the danger itself changed.
Likewise, Margolis describes the reactions of residents of Carlsbad,
New Mexico, to the potential use of nearby caves for long-term storage
of spent nuclear fuel. 38 Although one might have expected Carlsbad's
35 Id. at 30.
36 Id. at 124-31.

37 It is difficult to believe that the parents would subject their children to a situation they

believe is hazardous in order to avoid the cost of finding day care.
38 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 132.
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residents to oppose this plan, they have actively solicited placing the facility nearby. Margolis states that the residents believe that the site
would be safe in the long term and would yield economic benefits to the
community. Residents of Carlsbad see the waste site as a fungible commodity worth the risks, which they believe are low. By contrast, a hundred miles away, residents of Sante Fe strongly oppose the project.
Because they would experience little or no economic benefit, they are in
box number two and see no reason to question their beliefs that the risks
of siting this facility in their state are too great. As Margolis observes,
this pattern of opposition to environmentally sensitive projects is common. A geographic graph of resistance to such projects resembles a volcano. It is low at the center, then as one moves farther away, it rises
abruptly, then declines slowly. This phenomenon does not occur merely
because people living in different locations put different terms in their
cost-benefit equations. The residents of Carlsbad truly believe the facility will be safe, while those in Sante Fe do not.
Margolis uses these case studies to demonstrate that costs can move
both into and out of our cognitive processes for assessing risk. Costbenefit analysis with continuous variables does not come naturally to
people. It requires either some training to become an expert or some
direct "on screen" exposure to both the costs and benefits of a hazard. In
effect, the experience of being forced to confront the costs of an activity
mimics expertise. In the asbestos problem, parents did not merely face a
different cost-benefit calculus than they thought they would (although
they did as well); their beliefs about the risks of exposure to asbestos
actually changed. The same parents who had initially complained bitterly about their children's exposure to asbestos in the school now complained bitterly about over-zealous safety precautions. In the case of
asbestos in the schools, experience stood in for expertise and had a similar effect.
The policy prescription is clear. Social decisions should be structured so that individuals experience both the costs and benefits of exposure to environmental hazards. This re-structuring would ensure that
people do not over-react to risk and that they treat the problem the same
way that experts would. In the asbestos removal case, for example, New
York City might have been able to find alternative sites to send school
children during the day when schools were closed for asbestos removal.
However, doing so would have ensured that the costs of the program
remained out of the parents' cognitive processes for evaluating environmental hazards. Shifting some of the costs of the removal program to the
parents forced them to re-evaluate the danger of asbestos. They then
agreed with many of the experts who had previously expressed the opinion that asbestos removal was unnecessary and wasteful.
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As a close corollary, this story suggests that decisions should be
made at a local level. In the case of the storage of spent nuclear fuel, it
would perhaps be a mistake to let the state of New Mexico as a whole
determine whether a disposal facility will be built near Carlsbad. The
rest of the state seems stuck in a "better safe than sorry" mode, but because the citizens of Carlsbad gain benefits from the construction, they
39
have determined that the disposal facility is really not so dangerous.
Just as the experience of the costs in the asbestos case leads to the reevaluation of the risks of asbestos by the parents, the experience of the
economic gains by the citizens of Carlsbad produces a different evaluation of the risks of the disposal facility. Citizens of Santa Fe, who do not
experience benefits, consider the facility more hazardous.
The clear implication of this theory is that people disregard expertise and make unwise assessments of risks when the costs or benefits are
off-screen. Thus, decisions about risk should be made by a public that
experiences both risks and benefits from an environmental hazard.
Although Margolis does not endorse this policy, his evidence and arguments lend clear support to those who do.
.2. Improving Expert Decision-Making
Margolis saves his policy prescriptions for expert decision-making.
Margolis worries that experts bring a myopia to risk assessment. As a
prime example, he describes the incredibly conservative methods for determining whether a substance causes cancer.40 To make this determination, researchers typically administer extremely high doses of a substance
to the most sensitive strains of the most sensitive animals. Such conservatism is widespread. 4 1 Margolis thus converts his theory into a call for
a requirement that regulatory agencies "do no harm."'42 He does not
mean that an agency must undertake a full blown cost-benefit analysis
for every regulatory decision. Rather, he asserts that regulatory agencies
should assure themselves that their decisions do not cost more lives than
they save. 43 This assessment is designed to avoid the myopia that can
come from the persistent failure of individual decision-makers - expert
or lay - to incorporate all the consequences of their choices into their
risk analysis.
Margolis observes that his proposal resembles the efforts by the
104th Congress to reform administrative law,44 although he also notes
39 Id. at 132.

40 Id. at 155-58.
41 Id. at 158-60.
42 Id. at 165.
43 Id.

44 Id. at 167.
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that there are important distinctions as well. Congress had proposed requiring cost-benefit analysis for all regulations in at least one reform bill,
H.R. 994.45 Because this cost-benefit analysis would be judicially reviewable, the requirement would have virtually assured that there would
be less regulation. 46 Unlike H.R. 994, however, Margolis's reforms are
not designed to promote an agenda of de-regulation. Margolis believes
that his "do no harm" review should apply both to a decision to regulate
and one not to regulate. 47 Hence, Margolis's proposal is "regulation neutral," whereas H.R. 994 would have required a cost-benefit analysis only
for a decision to continue an existing regulation or enact a new one.
Decisions not to regulate or to repeal an existing regulation would have
been exempt from this mandate.
Much more than it resembles the 104th Congress's administrative
law reforms, Margolis's proposal resembles NEPA. Signed into law in
1970,48 NEPA responded to a growing concern that administrative agencies had become myopic, focusing on accomplishing their own aims
without regard to the consequences of their actions, particularly the environmental consequences. Agencies like the Army Corps of Engineers
worked to ensure that they could construct dams, lobbying Congress for
funds and authority to construct them, almost without concern that such
projects may have been unnecessary. Likewise, the Atomic Energy
Commission (now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission) argued explicitly that it should not have to take environmental considerations into account when making decisions about granting licenses for nuclear power
plants. 49 NEPA was Congress's attempt to address this myopia. NEPA
requires agencies to conduct a full analysis of the environmental consequences of all major federal actions.50 Although NEPA lacks any substantive requirement that agencies refrain from undertaking programs
that unnecessarily destroy the environment, 5 1 it has "strict" procedural
requirements. 52 NEPA's requirement that agencies assess the environmental consequences of their actions breaks them out of the myopia that
might otherwise grip their decision-making. Even if an agency fails to
learn anything from its description of the consequences of its actions, the
45 The Regulatory Sunset and Review Act of 1995, H.R. 994, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995).
46 It also included a sunset provision for any existing regulation that could not survive a,
cost-benefit analysis.
47

MARGoLis, supra note 1, at 187.

National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-109, 83 Stat. 852 (1970).
New Hampshire v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 406 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1969).
50 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994).
51 Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlene, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont
Yankee v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
52 Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1111
(D.C. Cir. 1971).
48
49
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public process of drafting an impact statement may galvanize 'public opposition to a particularly noxious project.
Twenty-seven years later, the problem of agency governance has
clearly changed. No longer is the public worried about agencies mindlessly consuming environmental resources. One of the chief concerns
today is the insistence of agencies to regulate regardless of the social
costs of their regulations. Such concerns are expressed well by Justice
Breyer in Breaking the Vicious Cycle53 and by Phillip Howard in The
Death of Common Sense.54 Both authors describe concerns that are similar to those that inspired NEPA. Just as the United States once worried
that the Army Corps of Engineers myopically built dams, we now worry
that the Environmental Protection Agency myopically attempts to rid all
drinking water of any hazardous material whatsoever, even if small
amounts of such materials are not dangerous. As Justice Breyer observed, "the last 10%" of any environmental cleanup effort is often far
more expensive than it is worth5 5; yet agencies consistently force industry to eliminate the last 10% of the risks. Many of the anecdotes in
Howard's popular book express a similar concern.
Margolis attributes this myopia among experts to the same thought
process that influences the general public. Despite their education, experts still come to see the world in binary terms. Once they see something as dangerous, it must be eliminated; if it is not dangerous, it may
safely be ignored. This thinking apparently pervades both expert and lay
decision-making. Experts may be better attuned to the parameters that
should be evaluated in determining what constitutes an intolerable risk,
but their decision-making is as prone to extremes as the public's.
II.

A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Overall, Margolis's book makes a neat package. Early on, he states
that his book is best thought of as a "psychological and sociological
gloss" on ideas like those of Justice Breyer, 56 and it is a valuable gloss
indeed. Justice Breyer worries about regulatory myopia and Margolis
provides a psychological theory that explains the source of this myopia.
In Margolis's theory, myopia is not just the symptom of over-reaching by
agencies or a consequence of public choice problems. Rather, agency
myopia is the product of the humanity of an agency's decision-makers.
The human brain has its limits, and the cognitive demands of efficient
53 STEPHEN BREYER,BREAKING THE VICIOUS CYCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993).
54 PHILLIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: How THE LAW IS SUFFOCATING
AMERICA (1994).
55 BREYER, supra note 53, at 11.
56 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 4.
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bureaucratic regulation of environmental hazards may exceed those limits. The principal implications of Margolis's theory, however, need some
refining, and perhaps go astray. Indeed, both prescriptions, that those
who experience both the risks and benefits of environmental hazards
should make decisions and that experts should be constrained by a "do
no harm" analysis, have costs that are off of Margolis's radar screen.
A.

THE

COSTS OF APPLYING MARGOLIS'S THEORY TO THE

GENERAL PUBLIC

To be perfectly fair, Margolis has not proposed re-structuring environmental decision-making. He agrees that this would be a "natural aim
for reform proposals," but asserts that the obstacles to doing so make it
generally unavailable. 57 But others would disagree. 58 Such a proposal,
however, would be a mistake (which perhaps explains why this cautious
book does not endorse it).
To see why, consider the similarities between Margolis's observations and the now forty-year-old psychological theory of cognitive dissonance. 59 Developed initially by Leon Festinger, the theory holds that
people do not tolerate logically inconsistent beliefs. According to Festinger, logical inconsistencies between one's beliefs create an aversive
state. This aversion to inconsistency in turn motivates us to change our
beliefs to avoid the inconsistency.
A classic experiment illustrates the similarities between dissonance
theory and Margolis's work. 60 Subjects were asked to engage in two
tedious, meaningless tasks.6 ' After completing the tasks, on their way
out of the study, the experimenter asked the subject to explain to the next
57 Id. at 150-52.
58 See supra note 4.
59 See generally, LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF CoGNrrivE DiSSONANCE (1957). Cognitive dissonance has had its ups and downs since it was first described. See, e.g., Leonard
Berkowitz & Patricia G. Devine, Research Traditions,Analysis, and Synthesis in Social Psychological Theories: The Case of Dissonance Theory, 15 PERsoNALITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.

BULL. 493 (1989); Anthony G. Greenwald & David L. Ronis, Twenty Years of Cognitive DisYonance: Case Study of the Evolution of a Theory, 85 PSYCHOL. REV. 53 (1978). Dissonance
research flourished throughout the 1960's and died suddenly at the hands of Darryl Bern's
1972 re-interpretation of the dissonance literature. See generally, Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, 6 ADVANcES rN ExPERnMENrAL Soc. PSYCHOL. 1 (1972). It has since been re-

vived in work by researchers like Claude Steele. See generally, Claude M. Steele, The
Psychology of Self-Affirmation: Sustainingthe Integrity of the Self, 21 ADvANcEs nN Ex.mMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 261 (1988).
60 Leon Festinger & J. M. Carlsmith, Cognitive Consequencesof ForcedCompliance, 58
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 203 (1959).

61 Subjects packed a set of differently shaped spools into a special drawer, slid the bottom out from the drawer so that the spools fell out, replaced the drawer, and then started over.
Subjects repeated this meaningless chore for one half-hour. Following the "spool-packing"
task, subjects spent another half-hour repeatedly turning 48 pegs on a pegboard one-quarter
turn. Id. at 204.
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subject (really a confederate of the experimenter) how to do the tasks and
to tell that subject that the tasks were actually interesting. 62 All subjects
complied with the request, but some were paid $20 for obliging and
others were paid only $1. The researchers then asked the subjects
whether they thought the tasks were actually interesting. Subjects who
were paid $20 asserted that they did not enjoy the task and found it dull.
However, the subjects paid only $1 said that they found the task interesting. To understand why, realize that the subject had just reported to a
stranger that the task was interesting. Subjects who were paid $20 had a
handy justification for their behavior - they were paid handsomely for
making the misrepresentation. However, people do not lie for only $1,
so those subjects altered their underlying beliefs about the task. The psychological pressure on the subjects who were paid only $1 can be stated
as a syllogism:
1. I am an honest person;
2. I reported to a stranger that the task was interesting;
therefore,
3. Either $1 is sufficient justification to misrepresent
myself or the task must have been interesting.
By contrast, the subjects paid $20 had a different thought process
1. I am an honest person;
2. I reported to a stranger that the task was interesting;
therefore,
3. Either $20 is sufficient justification to misrepresent
myself or the task must have been interesting.
Unlike $1, $20 probably was sufficient justification for the misrepresentation (the study was conducted with undergraduates in 1960). The subjects did not have to alter their beliefs about the task; their assertions to
the stranger were exchanged for the $20.
The study's results occurred for many of the same reasons that people are often stuck in Margolis's box number two. The subjects in the
study who were paid only $1 did not, in fact, lie in order to obtain the $1;
they lied because the experimenter asked them to do so. The subtle
power of such a request, however, was somewhat invisible to the subject.
Indeed, the genius of the study is that it would not have worked if the
subjects were paid nothing. The $1 was -a smoke screen that hid the real
reason that subjects complied with the experimenter's somewhat unusual
request. The subjects did not perceive the real reason that they complied
with the request, however, and it appeared to them as if they might have
62 The cover story for asking the subject to make this misrepresentation was that the
experiment involved manipulation of expectations.
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sold their integrity for $1. This thought being unacceptable, these subjects changed their beliefs about the task. Similarly, before they had
first-hand experience with the costs of asbestos removal, the parents in
New York City were unable to truly incorporate the costs of removal into
their thought process. Some aspects of social life are simply invisible.
Magolis's description of why people fear exposure to dioxin, a carcinogenic by-product of industry, and not aflatoxin, a naturally-occurring
carcinogen found in peanut butter, reveals the similarities between his
work and dissonance theory:
But if we look to fungibility, the reason for the contrast [between concern about dioxin and lack of concern
about aflatoxin] is not hard to see. Children like peanut
butter a lot, and adults recall liking peanut butter a lot
and sometimes still do. So giving up peanut butter is
something that readily prompts fungibility. A person
wants to know whether the risk is serious enough to warrant giving up something as nice as peanut butter, and so
she is quite willing to listen to arguments about how significant the risk might be weighed against the health
merits of peanuts. But there is no such easy route to
fungibility for dioxin. It is just an unwanted by-product.
The costs of extreme precautions run to some billions of
dollars, but spread sufficiently thinly across the economy
that few people can see any effect due to the precautions
63
proposed.
The cognitive dissonance version of Margolis's theory shows why
imposing costs and benefits of environmental hazards can be a destructive policy. Individuals within a community will experience the costs
and benefits of exposure to the hazard differently and may reach different
conclusions about the merits of incurring an environmental risk. In fact,
in a community that is exposed to an environmental hazard, it is common
to find substantial disagreement about whether the hazard is really dangerous. 64 In particular, there is a big gap between people who work for
the company that is the alleged cause of the environmental harm and
63 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 137.

64 There are great individual differences among people's general willingness to believe
that exposure to environmental hazards can cause significant health problems. Faye N.
Schmidt & Robert Gifford, A DispositionalApproach to HazardPerception: PreliminaryDevelopment of the EnvironmentalAppraisal Inventory, 9 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 57 (1989). In
particular, people with low socio-economic status tend to believe that industry is over-regulated and that environmental hazards pose less risk more than do people with high socioeconomic status. Rebecca S. Francis, Attitudes Toward Industrial Pollution, Strategiesfor
Protecting the Environment, and Environmental-Economic Trade-Offs, 12 J. APPLmD Soc.
PSYCHOL. 310, 324-25 (1983).
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those who do not. 65 This gap occurs even in extreme cases like the exposure at Love Canal, where numerous residents did not believe that they
were being poisoned by the leaking contents of hundreds of drums of
hazardous waste.6 6 Lois Gibbs, one of the leaders of the group of activist
residents of Love Canal, worried about which homes she could send her
children to on Halloween; she feared that some of the neighbors who
disagreed with her would harm them. 67 Cognitive dissonance explains
this situation easily. Consider the syllogism of the employee of a company that is the source of the environmental hazard:
1. I would not work for a company that poisons my
children;
2. I work for company X;
therefore,
68
3. Company X is not poisoning my children.
Dissonance ensures that beliefs about environmental hazards will follow
the characteristics Margolis has stated. They will be strongly held, difficult to dislodge, and yet will be remarkably sensitive to changes in the
costs and benefits that accompany them. Indeed, Margolis's description
of the parents and asbestos removal can be stated in a similar syllogism.
A difficult set of social problems can accompany the divergent cognitions that dissonance produces. They can tear a community or even a
family apart. Such disruptions counsel against any re-structuring of environmental decision on the notion that those who endure the risks and
benefits of environmental hazards are somehow better at making decisions. Experience would not make better choices, just more difficult
ones.
B.

THE COSTS OF

"Do No

HARM"

Less dramatic but equally problematic is Margolis's "do no harm"
review of regulatory decisions. The problems that this proposal raises
depend upon the further specifications that Margolis would add. Margo65 Evelyn J. Bromet et al., Long-Term Mental Health Consequences of the Accident at
Three Mile Island, 19 INT'L J. MErrrAL HEALTH 48, 56-57 (1990); Mary Amanda Dew et al.,
Application of a Temporal Resistance Model to Community Residents' Long-Term Beliefs
about the Three Mile Island Nuclear Accident, 17 J. APPLIED Soc. PSYCHOL. 1071, 1077-79

(1987).
66 Lois MARIE GIBBS & MURRAY LEVINE, LOVE CANAL:

MY STORY 20-26 (1982).
67 Id. at 80-81.
68 In the original work on cognitive dissonance, Festinger presented a similar description
of cigarette smoking. He used it as an example of how dissonance operates: "A person may
know that smoking is bad for him and yet continue to smoke ....
[This] person continues to
smoke, knowing that it is bad for his health, may also feel... [that] the chances of his health
suffering are not as serious as some would make out." FFSTINGER, supranote 59, at 2. Margolis uses the example of beliefs about the dangers of skiing in a similar way. MARGOLIS, supra
note 1, at 149.
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lis's substantive review could be implemented through one of three procedures. First, "do no harm" could consist of an additional procedural
review that all regulatory agencies must follow, modeled after NEPA.
Second, it could be implemented through centralized review in the executive branch, similar to Executive Order 12,866. Finally, Margolis's proposal might be directed at altering statutes which explicitly contradict his
principle, such as the Delaney Clause of the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act. 69 The first and second proposals create significant unwanted side effects.
To the extent that this proposal mimics NEPA, it should be expected
that it would carry all of NEPA's problems as well. Most significant
among these is NEPA's contribution to agency "ossification. '70 In the
past few decades, Congress and the courts have built up a significant
array of hurdles for regulation. 7 1 Even so-called "informal" rule-making
is now so cumbersome that agencies tend to avoid it entirely when they
can. 72 Adding yet another step to the regulatory process may or may not
produce better decisions, but is likely to produce fewer ones.
Margolis's proposal may create even more ossification than NEPA,
depending upon whether Margolis means it to have the substantive teeth
that NEPA lacks. If an agency had to ensure that its activities save more
lives than they cost, and if this requirement were subject to substantive
judicial review, then surely Margolis has invented agency "petrification."
As with most of the administrative procedures with which a regulatory
agency must comply, Margolis's "do no harm" review would be conducted in an exceptionally hostile environment. Parties that are
threatened with new regulations already use the procedural aspects of
administrative law to delay the regulatory process significantly. Substantive review would provide an even more potent delay tactic. Indeed, it
may be that Margolis refrained from recommending full cost-benefit
analysis because of such concerns. Even his weaker, "lives saved/lives
lost" review, however, represents a quantum increase in the level of judicial review of agency actions.
If the proposal follows the model of the executive orders creating
centralized review of agency action by the Office of Management and
Budget ("OMB"), it would carry all of the problems of the existing cen69 The Delaney Clause, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3) (1994), has recently been modified substantially by the Food Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (1996).
70 Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DuIc L.J. 1385, 1405 (1992).

71 Id. at 1396-1436
72 Robert A. Anthony, InterpretiveRules, Policy Statements, GuidanceManuals, and the
Like - Should FederalAgencies Use Them To Bind the Public?,41 DuKE L.J. 1311, 1316-19

(1992).

694

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 6:673

tralized review schemes. Currently, under Executive Order 12,866, 73 all
executive-branch agencies 74 must submit all "significant" federal regulations to the OMB for cost-benefit analysis.7 5 This review also adds to
the ossification process of administrative action, as OMB review can be
time-consuming. 76 What is more, the OMB has been accused of using its
central review power as a back-door method of delaying or even eliminating important regulations. 77 OMB review tends to be out of the public view, raising the concern that even if Margolis has proposed a
sensible system, it may be converted into another mechanism for increasing the influence of the President on rule-making.
Finally, Margolis may simply be advocating the elimination of specific provisions of legislation that contradict his "do no harm" thesis.
Margolis specifically identifies the Delaney Clause of the Food, Drug,
and Cosmetics Act as a product of myopic risk assessment. 78 This statute forbids the sale of any food additive that has any risk of cancer whatsoever. Margolis is not alone in criticizing the Delaney Clause, 79 and it
has, in fact, been recently amended.80 In the case of the Delaney Clause,
Margolis's prescription is clear. It is less clear how he would deal with
other statues that have a less obvious myopic slant. For example, the
Clean Air Act requires the EPA to set ambient air quality standards at
levels that are "requisite to protect the public health. '8 1 Does this provision's failure to mention the costs of clean air make it myopic? If it is
administered by an EPA that is at least sensitive to cost issues in spite of
the statute's omissions, does that sensitivity cure the myopia? Margolis
echoes Justice Breyer's endorsement of cost-benefit analysis in environmental regulation, 8 2 but it is not entirely clear how his somewhat different perspective on cost-benefit analysis would resolve the issues as they
arise in each different context. Without more specificity as to which statutes it would target, this version of Margolis's proposal is difficult to
evaluate.
73
74
75
76
THoMAs

Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1996).
As distinguished from independent agencies.
Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 6-7.
McGarity, supra note 70, at 1405-07. For a thorough analysis of OMB review, see

0. McGARITY,

REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN

THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 27-91 (1991).
77 Erik D. Olson, The Quiet Shift of Power: Office of Management and Budget Supervision of Environmental ProtectionAgency Rulemaking Under Executive Order 12,291, 4 VA. J.
NAT. RESOURcES L. 1, 40-64 (1984).
78 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 174-75.
79 See, e.g., BREYER, supra note 53, at 41; Sunstein, supra note 9, at 300.
80 Food Quality Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1513 (1996).

81 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1994).
82 MARGOLIS, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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III.

CONCLUSIONS

Policy prescriptions are not the strength of Dealing With Risk.
Rather, the book is best thought of as providing a superior account of the
gap between the beliefs of experts and the general public about the dangers posed by environmental hazards. Margolis contends that this gap
results from a combination of three factors: (1) the tendency of people to
view hazards in a bi-polar fashion; (2) the fact that experts and the public
incorporate different costs and benefits into their assessment of risk; and
(3) the ability of these costs and benefits to influence peoples' determinations of what is dangerous. Margolis's theory implies that both experts
and the public fall prey to a myopia in risk assessment that prevents them
from incorporating all of the costs and benefits of social risks into their
evaluations of environmental hazards. Thus, in addition to explaining
the inadequacies of lay decision-making, the theory also explains the
phenomenon of regulatory myopia that scholars like Cass Sunstein and
Justice Breyer have documented. As such, Margolis has added an intricate theory to the literature on the psychology of risk assessment. It is a
theory that resonates with the older work that predates the modem psychology of judgment and choice, and thus brings the phenomenon of lay
and expert disagreement into a broader psychological context. What
should be done about this cognitive difficulty, however, remains unclear.

